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Abstract 
In the context of the ‘Zimbabwe crisis’ of the early 2000s, both popular and academic accounts 
frequently discussed Zimbabweans as passive victims of their government, hereby suggesting 
that the extensive efforts of the state to create a ‘patriotic’ citizenry through the cultural project 
of the Third Chimurenga were largely successful. This article argues that the absence of physical 
protests in the streets should not be equalled to an absence of resistance. By adopting a narrow 
focus on the forms of resistance associated with dramatic revolutions and grand rebellions, 
journalists and scholars neglected the everyday forms of resistance through which Zimbabweans 
sought to challenge the state such as popular humour and rumour. These nascent forms of 
resistance could have been drawn upon in a more sustained way by the political opposition and 
civil society in order to provoke political change.  
 
Popular and academic accounts on the ‘Zimbabwe crisis’ have expressed disappointment or 
surprise about the lack of resistance among Zimbabweans against the Zimbabwe African 
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) regime. These accounts expected a particular kind of 
resistance to occur, echoing the street protests part of the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine in late 
2004, the popular protests in Madagascar in January 2009 and the demonstrations in Georgia in 
April 2009. This discourse on ‘passive Zimbabweans’ was expressed both in popular media and 
academic accounts. For example, in a 2005 article entitled “Dictator’s grip is tightened by weak 
protest” in the British newspaper The Daily Telegraph, journalist David Blair suggested that the 
‘docile nature’ of Zimbabweans had enabled President Mugabe to strengthen his rule. Against 
the background of ‘Operation Murambatsvina’1, Blair lamented the way in which Zimbabweans 
failed to resist the attempts of the state to demolish their homes: 
 
In fairness, there has been little spontaneous discontent. A few stones were thrown at police during 
the urban demolitions and street battles briefly erupted in towns such as Chitungwiza. But many 
Zimbabweans meekly submitted to the destruction of their homes and livelihoods. 
Any outsider with goodwill towards this beautiful country is led towards some profoundly disturbing 
conclusions. The entire Zimbabwean nation seems to have given up opposing Mr Mugabe. Put 
bluntly, they are waiting for God to remove him. The MDC’s failure to offer any protest or 
resistance reflects the popular mood. 
                                                 
1 Operational Murambatsvina (‘Operation Drive Out Trash’ in chiShona) refers to the 2005 attempts of the 
Zimbabwean government to ‘clean up’ the urban areas. The Operation resulted in widespread displacement of urban 
backyard dwellers and street vendors. 
2 
 
But if 12 million Zimbabweans have no will to rid themselves of a dictator, why should anyone else 
help? Perhaps Zimbabweans deserve the most damning verdict of all - that they have the leader they 
deserve. 
I hasten to add that I do not believe this. But looking at the country’s recent history, I find it hard to 
listen to Zimbabweans who blame the outside world for failing to help. They have done precious 
little to help themselves and Mr Tsvangirai seems most adept at machine-gunning himself in both 
feet.2 
 
Similarly, Richard Dowden, the previous Africa Editor of The Economist, wrote in an article in 
The Times that “[t]he opposition Movement for Democratic Change has missed its chance to 
follow the example of the citizens of Ukraine, Georgia and Madagascar and take to the streets to 
force out a tyrannical ruler”.3 Especially, in the run-up to Zimbabwe’s presidential elections in 
April 2005, comparisons between the lack of resistance in Zimbabwe and the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine were often made. International media expected ordinary Zimbabweans to rise up and 
stand against the Mugabe regime through protests in the streets. Whereas South Africans had 
actively resisted the Apartheid regime in a heroic, grassroots struggle for freedom, Zimbabweans 
were castigated for passively accepting a murderous government.  
While popular media accounts emphasised Zimbabweans’ lack of resistance against the 
ZANU-PF regime, some academic accounts have argued that government’s efforts to create a 
‘patriotic’ citizenry devoted to ZANU-PF through state-controlled media such as The Herald and 
the monopoly broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), have been largely 
successful. A public opinion survey, part of a series known as Afrobarometer, concluded that 
government media in Zimbabwe had succeeded in their efforts to win the hearts and minds of 
Zimbabweans (Chikwanha, Sithole and Bratton 2004; Bratton, Chikwanha and Sithole 2005). 
Afrobarometer measures “the social, political and economic atmosphere in Africa”.4 The project 
compares “trends in public attitudes” in various African countries and shares results with 
“decision makers, policy advocates, civic educators, journalists, researchers, donors and 
investors, as well as average Africans who wish to become more informed and active citizens”.5  
The researchers of the Afrobarometer survey were confronted with an outcome that they 
found difficult to explain. Although Zimbabweans seemed to blame the government for the 
deteriorating economic conditions, the results of the survey concluded that many Zimbabweans 
still respected and supported President Mugabe. The research team attempted to explain this 
‘paradox’ through three factors: economic patronage, political fear and persuasion by the mass 
media. They did not detect a statistically significant relationship between the first two factors and 
continued support to the government. However, they found that the relation between the third 
factor (persuasion by the mass media) and the positive evaluation of government was statistically 
significant. Because readers attached a significant amount of trust in government media, they 
concluded that this confidence must have motivated and convinced readers to continue to support 
the ruling regime.  
The research team here implied a straightforward, causal relation or ‘hypodermic needle 
effect’ between trust in the media and support for the regime. However, this relation could be 
turned around as well. Would readers who are inclined to support the regime at all costs not also 
support the type of media in which their leaders are portrayed in a favourable way, i.e. state-
                                                 
2 Blair, David, Dictator’s grip is tightened by weak protest. In: The Daily Telegraph, 27 July 2005.  
3 Dowden, Richard, We’ve got to talk to Mugabe. In: The Times, 16 May 2005. 
4 See the Afrobarometer website: http://www.afrobarometer.org.  
5 See the Afrobarometer website: http://www.afrobarometer.org. 
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controlled media such as The Herald and ZBC? In other words, could people’s support to 
government not precede their preference for certain media? The research team decided to argue 
the other way around in order to enable them to give their final report the catchy title “The power 
of propaganda” or, as David Moore cynically noted in a response to the report, to ensure that “we 
can guarantee continued donor funding for the science of surveying democratic progress across 
the Dark continent” (2005, p. 112). While Blair and Dowden expected a particular type of 
resistance that Zimbabweans did not demonstrate, the Afrobarometer research team concluded 
on the basis of a quantitative data that ZANU-PF’s ‘propaganda’ had been successful. 
 
Beyond dramatic revolutions and rebellions 
Blair and Dowden’s focus on dramatic confrontations between Zimbabweans and their regime, 
expressed in street protests, has ignored other ways in which ordinary Zimbabweans might have 
resisted their government in their day-to-day lives. Similar to the analysis of Blair and Dowden, 
scholars belonging to the field of subaltern studies have pointed to the important role of ordinary 
people in bringing about revolutions and rebellions.6 The Subaltern Studies Group, which was 
founded by the Indian historian Ranajit Guha and drew major inspiration from Antonio 
Gramsci’s work, responded to the elitist bias of particularly Indian historiography and its focus 
on the agency of ‘Big Men’. Instead, subaltern studies scholars emphasised the role of women, 
peasants, industrial workers and low-caste labourers in bringing about a change in power. As 
Haynes and Prakash (1991, p. 1) have argued, many scholars have been attracted to highlight the 
role of ordinary people in rebellions and insurgencies: 
 
Dramatic confrontations between the dominant and the dominated – manifest in riots, rebellions, 
revolutions and organized political movements – have always constituted a major source of attention 
for social historians, sociologists and political scientists, particularly those keen to find among the 
oppressed the universal urge toward liberation.  
 
However, as they argue, the focus on these “extraordinary moments of collective protest” has 
precluded scholars from examining the “more enduring, ‘everyday’ forms of resistance 
constantly present in the behaviours, traditions and consciousness of the subordinate” (Haynes 
and Prakash, 1991, p. 1). According to them, resistance should not strictly be understood as 
referring to physical and material protests in the streets but is defined as the broader set of 
practices used by the dominated to contest those who make attempts to dominate them. The 
concept of resistance then encompasses a wide-ranging collection of cultural practices such as 
rituals, gossip, humour, dress and behavioural codes. Similarly, in his influential book Weapons 
of the weak, James Scott conceptualised everyday forms of resistance as “the prosaic but 
constant struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labour, food, taxes, rents, 
and interest from them. Most forms of this struggle stop well short of outright collective 
defiance” (1985, p. xvi). 
While Dowden and Blair failed to take into account everyday forms of resistance, the 
Afrobarometer research team concluded that state media had largely been successful in 
interpellating Zimbabweans as loyal supporters of the ruling party ZANU-PF. In their analysis, 
they relied on quantitative research in order to investigate what they understood as a causal 
relationship between state media and Zimbabweans’ support to the ruling party. However, the 
attempt of the research team to prove the ‘effect’ of media on ordinary people has long been 
                                                 
6 See for example: Guha (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989). 
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problematised by a range of qualitative audience studies scholars. For example, David Gauntlett 
(1998, p. 120) has argued that if “after over sixty years of a considerable amount of research 
effort, direct effects of media upon behaviour have not been clearly identified”, we therefore 
“should conclude that they are simply not there to be found”. Although actors ranging from 
governments to advertising agencies have a vested interest in knowing the impact of media on 
audiences, Gauntlett and others deem it impossible to find clear empirical evidence of the 
influence of media on people’s behaviour or beliefs. 
Furthermore, by virtue of its method, quantitative audience research has not been able to 
document the complex ways in which newspaper readers, television viewers or radio listeners 
read and interpret a text. The Bratton team was faced with the finding that many Zimbabweans 
appeared supportive of their government. In their search for an explanation for this finding, they 
ultimately concluded that their support must have been the result of successful government 
propaganda. However, their use of a quantitative methodology ignores the highly divergent ways 
in which Zimbabweans might engage with state media. Active audience scholars have 
highlighted the creative ways in which audiences have interpreted media texts and have 
emphasised the failure of ideology in interpellating audiences (Fiske & Hartley, 1978; Fiske, 
1987; Ang, 1985, 1991, 1996; Morley, 1980, 1992; Liebes and Katz, 1990).  
This article treats popular humour and rumour as everyday forms of resistance through 
which Zimbabweans sought to contest attempts of the state to both interpellate them as loyal 
ruling party supporters and to counter efforts of the state to monopolise the public arena. 
Furthermore, the article argues that an investigation of popular humour defies the findings of the 
Afrobarometer research team and highlights the multiple ways in which Zimbabweans have 
engaged with the attempts of government-controlled television, radio and press to influence their 
political views.  
 
Public speech in the context of the ‘Zimbabwe crisis’ 
The efforts of the Zimbabwean government to restrict the public sphere have been widely 
documented. Since 2000, government has deployed a range of measures with the aim to exclude 
critical perspectives on the crisis, mediated by either global news media or local private 
newspapers, from reaching the public arena. In the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections, new 
legislation such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) resulted in 
tighter controls on private newspapers and foreign media houses. The national broadcaster 
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) dominated the airwaves and government did not 
allow any private radio or television station to start broadcasting. The imposition of local content 
quota on ZBC resulted in the disappearance of CNN and BBC news bulletins, foreign soap 
operas and foreign pop music. 
Apart from curtailing formal media, the Zimbabwe government also introduced a range 
of measures to gain control over public speech. For example, the Public Order and Security Act 
(POSA), which was gazetted into law on 22 January 2002, imposed severe restrictions on the 
publication or communication of false statements prejudicial to the state and of undermining the 
authority of, or insulting, the President.7 It also imposed severe constraints on demonstrations 
                                                 
7 While POSA was supposed to repeal the repressive Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (LOMA) which dated back 
from the colonial regime, POSA did not significantly differ in content from LOMA. The text of POSA can be 
downloaded from Kubatana, a NGO network alliance project. Check: 
http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/legisl/020122posa.asp?orgcode=par001&year=2002&range_start=1 (last 
accessed: 11 January 2009). 
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and public gatherings under the pretext of “maintaining public order”. In addition, government 
introduced the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, which became effective on 1 July 
2006 and also introduced similar restrictions to those under POSA.8  
In the wake of the introduction of these new laws, a number of people were arrested and 
some charged for uttering statements deemed to be insulting or undermining the President. 
Travellers in commuter omnibuses were particularly victimised. In Zimbabwe, passengers often 
engage in lively conversations and discussions in buses and taxis. Politics or the broader 
economic crisis have been recurrent topics of these public conversations but these public forms 
of critical speech have not been without their risks. For example, in November 2004, a commuter 
omnibus traveller was overheard by an intelligence agent as saying that “Mugabe was a dictator 
while British Prime Minister Tony Blair was a liberator”.9 Subsequently, he was arrested for 
undermining the authority of the president. In December 2004, another traveller was overheard 
telling his brother not to be “thick-headed like Mugabe”. Subsequently, he was held in custody 
for a number of days.10 In January 2007, a commuter was arrested after he shouted that he 
wished the US government would intervene in Zimbabwe like it had done in Iraq in order to 
remove Mugabe.11  
In this repressive context in which Zimbabweans had limited access to information 
outside control of government and in which their attempts to criticise government in public 
speech were criminalised, popular humour and rumour still flourished. Jokes and rumours are of 
course not identical. Rumours could be seen as ‘counter-truths’ or other accounts of some sort of 
‘reality’ whereas jokes generally do not make a claim to truth but instead primarily serve to make 
others laugh. What jokes and rumours share is that they are both orally transmitted (although 
increasingly also via the internet, mobile phones and occasionally through tabloids or 
broadsheets) and also frequently seek to comment on social or political affairs. As Zimbabwean 
poet Comrade Fatso pointed out in his blog, rumours were rife in the capital city Harare: 
 
Rumour rhymes with ‘ruma’, Shona for bite. Harare has literally been bitten by rumours. Our city is 
famed for many things but one thing specifically. The ability to turn no news into headlines. The 
skill of spinning no knowledge into street wisdom. The hustle of selling unconfirmed stories on a 
hungry parallel market. Our only non-state daily newspaper [The Daily News] was bombed so the 
people’s paper is the people’s stories, nyayas [‘story’ in chiShona] that circulate like a whisper at a 
bottle store.12  
 
In the numerous queues that rapidly appeared and grew in length since 2000, Zimbabweans 
actively debated politics irrespective of their fears. In commuter omnibuses, hair salons and beer 
halls, Zimbabweans shared jokes mocking the ZANU-PF regime. Jokes and gossip did not only 
                                                 
8 The text of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act can be downloaded from Kubatana, a NGO network 
alliance project. Check: 
http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/legisl/050603crimlaw.asp?orgcode=par001&year=2005&range_start=1 (last 
accessed: 11 January 2009). 
9 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2005). Zimbabwe: facts and fictions. An audit of the recommendations of 
the fact-finding mission of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, p. 46, available from: 
http://www.hrforumzim.com/special_hrru/audit_achpr_fact-finding_mission.pdf (last accessed: 11 January 2009). 
10 Zimbabwean held for Mugabe ‘slur’, BBC News online, 15 December 2004, available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4098237.stm (last accessed: 11 January 2009).  
11 Phiri, Gift, Mugabe faces unprecedented ridicule, The Zimbabwean, 26 January 2007. 
12 See Comrade Fatso’s blog: http://comradefatso.vox.com/library/post/the-rumour-city.html (last accessed: 1 
November 2008). 
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circulate in Harare but also reached rural areas of Zimbabwe as well as the growing Zimbabwean 
diaspora in the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa. Rumours and jokes were 
not only transmitted orally but were increasingly mediated via SMS messages and emails (Moyo, 
2009; Willems, 2009).  
 The prevalence of popular humour and rumour in Zimbabwe should be understood in the 
context of what has often been referred to as ‘radio trottoir’ (‘pavement radio’ in English), i.e. 
“the popular and unofficial discussion of current affairs in Africa” (Ellis, 1989, p. 321). The term 
radio trottoir was invented by inhabitants of Brazzaville and Kinshasa in Congo but there are 
equivalent terms in other parts of Africa such as ‘Radio Mall’ in Botswana, ‘Radio Kankan’ in 
Guinea, ‘Radio Treichville’ in Cote d’Ivoire, ‘Radio Potato’ in South Africa, ‘Radio Boca Boca’ 
in Lusophone Africa and ‘le téléphone arabe’ in North Africa (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004, p. 28; 
Nyamnjoh, 2005, p. 210). Similar terminology can also be found elsewhere in the world such as 
in Armenia where the term ‘Radio Yerevan’ referred to the practice of joking during the Soviet 
period. Because Zimbabweans had restricted access to alternative views of the crisis due to the 
high costs and lack of availability of print media, internet and alternative broadcasters, jokes and 
rumours emerged as important alternative media and, as Moyo (2009) has argued, could even be 
treated as forms of ‘citizen journalism’. 
 As Nyamnjoh points out, “rumour is most likely to become an alternative source of 
information during a crisis, when there is a heightened need for information in the public. This is 
especially likely when the conventional media, for whatever reason, lack credibility” (2005, p. 
216). Ellis argues that radio trottoir should be seen “in the context of the oral traditions and 
respect for oral culture which modern Africa has inherited from its past” (1989, p. 321). 
Nyamnjoh similarly explains “the ubiquity of rumour in Cameroon, not simply by the country’s 
strong oral tradition, but also owing to the rigid control of information and communication by the 
power elite” (2005, p. 211).  
 
Popular humour and rumour as everyday forms of resistance 
Given the constraints that were imposed on public speech in Zimbabwe, popular humour and 
rumour can be considered as the everyday ways in which Zimbabweans resisted to be subjected 
to power. While Dowden and Blair as well as the Bratton research team conceptualised 
Zimbabweans as docile, passive victims of ZANU-PF propaganda, an investigation of popular 
humour and rumour points us to the less visible ways in which resistance in Zimbabwe 
manifested itself on an everyday basis. Many scholars, including those in the field of subaltern 
studies, have understood resistance in a narrow manner, as referring to mass protests in the 
streets. Furthermore, because of their analytical focus on resistance, they have also neglected the 
way in which resistance is constantly shaped by forms of power and conversely, shape relations 
of power. It is impossible to analytically separate power from resistance; both are entangled with 
each other. Power and resistance should not be treated as “polar opposites but as phenomena 
which often coexist and shape each other” (Haynes and Prakash, 1991, p. 13).  
In the case of the Zimbabwe crisis, one cannot understand the ways in which the ruled 
related to the rulers without taking into account how those in power sought to subject citizens to 
their rule. Analyses that have stressed the passivity of ordinary Zimbabweans in the face of the 
crisis have often failed to analyse the manner in which the Zimbabwean government sought to 
discipline its citizens into submission. As the previous section demonstrated, the state introduced 
a number of measures to restrict not only media but even public speech. Within the constraints of 
such a repressive state, mass street protests are risky affairs which could cost lives. In these 
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contexts, less visible and underground forms of resistance become more prevalent. As the 
previous section demonstrated, there were also clear risks involved in telling a joke or spreading 
a rumour. But Zimbabweans defied constraints on public speech and attempts by the government 
to monopolise the public arena through popular humour and rumour. Jokes and rumours should 
then be understood as response to an environment in which public talk and verbal culture are 
common but also should be seen as a reaction to a situation in which a government makes 
attempts to monopolise the public arena and to clamp down on dissent. Jokes did not only mock 
the way in which the state mediated itself in The Herald and on ZBC but also defied the limits on 
freedom of expression imposed by the state.  
As a number of scholars have pointed out, after 2000, the ruling party ZANU-PF faced a 
crisis of legitimacy and increasingly began to use a narrow form of patriotic history in order to 
justify its continued rule over Zimbabwe (Ranger, 2004; Bull-Christiansen, 2004; Kriger, 2006; 
Tendi, 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2009). State-controlled press, radio and television 
were crucial in inviting Zimbabweans to become part of this patriotic ‘party-nation’ (Kriger, 
2003, p. 74). Veterans of the 1970s liberation war took centre stage in these mediations as the 
true heroes who had been crucial in the birth of the nation. The concept of ‘national hero’ 
became a key feature on the national broadcaster ZBC, popularised for example through the 
annual televised ‘Heroesplush’ music gala and the commemorative galas introduced to honour 
deceased politicians such as Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda. In Zimbabwe, the declaration 
of ‘national heroes’ has always been highly contested (Kriger, 1995; Werbner, 1998). However, 
commemorative practices became even more politicised in the climate of the early 2000s in 
which the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was constantly delegitimised by 
government as an ‘unheroic’ party, a party without liberation war credentials and a party of 
‘unpatriotic sell-outs’ who primarily took their orders from white Rhodesians and ‘the British’.13  
In the early 2000s, government’s official definition of a ‘national hero’ did not only refer 
to ‘fallen heroes’ (i.e. those who passed away during the liberation war) and veterans of the 
1970s guerrilla war but also came to include new ‘heroes’ of the Third Chimurenga who had 
shown their loyalty to the ruling party ZANU-PF through for example their prominent role in the 
government-sponsored land occupations.14 Through their tributes to ‘national heroes’, state 
television and radio invited Zimbabweans to honour them and to show their gratitude towards 
these ‘vana vevhu’ (‘sons of the soil’ in chiShona) who had sacrificed their lives to fight in the 
bush guerrilla war to liberate Zimbabwe from the colonial yoke. However, popular humour 
frequently challenged official definitions of the ‘national hero’. Through jokes, Zimbabweans 
resisted to be interpellated as ‘patriotic’ subjects who were called on to honour old and new 
‘heroes’. For example, in December 2006, the following joke circulated via SMS: 
 
You are my hero!!!!!!!!!!! Hie 
                                                 
13 The MDC was established in the wake of the National Working People’s Convention organised by the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in February 1999. This convention was attended by workers, some peasants, 
representatives from civil society organizations including the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) which later 
came to play an important role in the formation of the MDC. 
14 The chiShona word ‘Chimurenga’ refers to a traditional warrior and legendary hero in the 1890s, Sororenzou 
Murenga, who was renowned for his fighting skills (Vambe 2004: 167). The word is normally used to refer to the 
early Shona and Ndebele uprisings of 1893 and 1896 against white settler rule (First Chimurenga) and to the 
liberation struggle against the Rhodesian Front regime in the 1960s and 1970s (Second Chimurenga). In the course 
of the major land occupations which commenced in February 2002, the government came to refer to these invasions 
and to the fast track land reform programme as the ‘Third Chimurenga’. 
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You are a true hero! U survived with no fuel, sugar, cooking oil, bread , drinking dirty water, power 
cuts, was hit by Operation Murambatsvina but missed Operation Garikai15, robbed of your millions 
by Gono16, and it now costs you Z$30 000 to bury a loved one, but u are eager for 2007!  
 
YOU DESERVE A GALA! 
 
HAPPY 2007! 
 
In the increasingly challenging economic context, jokes suggested that the real heroes were not 
those who fought in the liberation war or participated in the Third Chimurenga but instead were 
ordinary Zimbabweans who were trying to survive in the dire economic circumstances. With 
inflation skyrocketing, massive shortages of basic commodities and poor availability of water 
and electricity, the joke accorded hero status to ordinary Zimbabweans as opposed to ZANU-PF 
elites. 
Another joke poked fun at the ‘heroine’s welcome’ which Zimbabwean swimmer Kirsty 
Coventry received after winning three medals during the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, 
Greece. On her return home to Zimbabwe, Coventry was awaited at the airport by around 2,000 
Zimbabweans, including the Minister of Education, Sports and Culture, Aeneas Chigwedere. In a 
press conference, Chigwedere said that he awaited Coventry at the airport in order “to welcome 
back home one of the greatest ambassadors of Zimbabwe”. 17 Chigwedere even explored offering 
her a diplomatic passport. Upon arrival in Harare, Coventry also was offered an official reception 
at State House which was organised by President Mugabe. Soon after the event, the following 
joke circulated in Zimbabwe: 
 
Chinoz18 was there at a party hosted for Kirsty. He asked the MC to give his own speech and here it 
was: “Pamberi nekubatana, Pamberi naKitsi, Pasi nevarungu, Pasi nevasina mabvi. 2day taungana 
pano tichipemberera kuhwinha kwaKitsi pakubhaguja kumaOlympia. Kitsi aratidza kuti mweya 
waNehanda Nyakasikana waimutungamirira stereki nokuti zimhandara rakaita zvenjuzu chaiyo. Ini 
nemamwe ma”O” Vets takagara pasi tikaona zvakakodzera kuti apihwe Mhembaship yeku 
yeZNLWVA (War Vet Asso). Ikozvino Kitsi ave neAllowed yekupamba ivhu pamwe nesu. 
VePolitibhuru takagara navo pasi tikavaudza kuti anofanira kupihwa ruremekedzo rwegamba 
rerusununguko nekuti mwana uyu wakatisunungura kubva 1980 tainge takasungirwa zvinhu 
tichitadza kubata kana menduru imwe. Iyi yaarwa iForth Chimurenga. Congrachureshenzi Kitsi, Our 
national Hero, galant Son Of the soil, Mwana wevhu” Mhururu nemuridzo uko “Thengi u vhere 
machi”.19  
 
Translation from chiShona: 
                                                 
15 ‘Operation Garikai’ (‘live well’ in chiShona) refers to the ambitious housing scheme that government promised 
those whose houses were demolished in Operation Murambatsvina.  
16 Gono refers to Gideon Gono, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. 
17 Red carpet for Zim’s golden girl, Independent Online News, 25 August 2004, available from: 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?sf=628&set_id=6&click_id=628&art_id=qw1093449785968O425 (last accessed: 9 
January 2009). 
18 Chinoz refers to Joseph Chinotimba, who presented himself as an ex-war veteran and played an important role as 
leader of the farm occupations in early 2000. Because of his role in the occupations, government heralded him as a 
loyal ZANU-PF supporter. He later became the National Vice-Chairman of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War 
Veterans’ Association and embarked on a political career by standing as a ZANU-PF candidate in the March 2003 
parliamentary by-elections for Highfield, Harare constituency and in the March 2008 parliamentary elections for 
Buhera South constituency. On both occasions, he was unsuccessful. 
19 Message posted to ZvaJokes (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZvaJokes) on 25 August 2005 by Carlo. 
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Chinoz was there at a party hosted for Kirsty. He asked the MC to give his own speech and here it 
was: “Forward with unity. Forward with Kirsty. Down with whites. Down with those without 
knees.20 Today we are gathered here to celebrate the achievements of Kirsty in the swimming 
competitions at the Olympics. Kirsty showed that she was guided by the spirit medium of Nehanda 
for sure. Kirsty swam like a mermaid. Myself and other war veterans sat down and saw it fit for her 
to be guaranteed membership to the ZNLWVA (Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans’ 
Association). Kirsty is now allowed to occupy land with us. We sat down with the Politburo and 
agreed that Kirsty should be given the honour accorded to a national heroine of the liberation 
struggle because she liberated us from the burden of having to wait since 1980 for only one Olympic 
medal. Her fight is the Fourth Chimurenga. Congratulations Kirsty, Our national Hero, gallant son of 
the soil, son of the soil”. [Ululations and whispers]. “Thank you very much”. 
 
The joke mocks the official welcome granted by the Zimbabwean government to a white 
Zimbabwean, Kirsty Coventry. While Coventry was of course not officially declared a ‘national 
hero’, a status only conferred upon death, the joke exposed what it perceived as a temporary 
rupture in the discourse of state media which had written white Zimbabweans out of the national 
imaginary. State media generally portrayed white Zimbabweans as ‘unpatriotic’, not belonging 
to the nation, and even contributing to the destruction of the nation through their support to the 
opposition MDC. The joke ridicules the seemingly contradictory approach of the Zimbabwean 
government which suddenly praises a white Zimbabwean. It also caricatures war veteran and 
ZANU-PF stalwart Joseph Chinotimba (Chinoz) as the ‘fool’ who in front of Kirsty shouts the 
liberation war slogan “Down with whites. Down with those without knees”. The relevance of 
skin colour as criteria for membership of the nation is temporarily suspended in the joke, and 
Kirsty is embraced as ‘one of us’.  
The joke not only criticises the politicisation of the conferral of ‘national hero’ status and 
the appropriation of ‘national heroes’ for party politics but also comments on the widening of the 
criteria that determine who qualifies for hero status. While initially, this status was conferred to 
those who had been instrumental in the 1970s liberation war, the joke suggests that in the 2000s 
anyone useful to the ruling party could be declared a national hero. It hereby fundamentally 
challenges the national imaginary of the ‘party nation’ as articulated through the state media. 
Through the state-controlled media, Zimbabweans experienced the state on an everyday basis in 
their living rooms. However, by no means were they passive victims in the face of the stringent 
controls on the public sphere. Through popular humour and rumour, they actively defied 
limitations on freedom of expression imposed by the Zimbabwe government. While the Bratton 
research team concluded that state propaganda had been successful, an analysis of popular 
humour shows the multiple ways in which Zimbabweans interpreted state media texts.  
 
The implications for power 
As Haynes and Prakash have argued, power and resistance are intricately entangled with each 
other. Resistance is not only shaped by the constraints imposed by those in power but also 
continuously provokes power to respond. Many scholars assume that only mass street protests 
can force a government out of power and that everyday forms of resistance are unable to bring 
about a change in power relations. Some have even argued that these forms of resistance can 
actually contribute to the maintenance of the political status quo. For example, in the context of 
Spain under Franco, Brandes (1977, p. 345-346) has argued that jokes did not have “any positive 
                                                 
20 The expression ‘those without knees’ originates from early encounters between white settlers and Africans. 
Because white settlers wore trousers, Africans began to refer to them as ‘those without knees’ because their knees 
were made invisible by the trousers. 
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effect on actual political life in the country. Political humour in Spain has operated as a safety 
valve for anti-regime sentiment, and in this sense has had a conservative influence. Laughter 
creates at least a temporary sense of well-being and satisfaction, and to this extent political jokes 
may be perceived as a means by which Spaniards trick themselves into the acceptance of 
unpleasant realities”. For Brandes (1977, p. 346), “political humour dissipates energy or deflects 
it away from direct political action”. Under communist rule, Romanians even had a joke which 
also held the view that humour dissuaded people from standing up against their leaders: “Do you 
know what they say? The Hungarians, they make revolutions. The Poles, they make strikes. The 
Romanians, they make jokes” (Cochran, 1989, p. 272). In this perspective, jokes are thus 
believed to relieve stress and anxieties, thereby reducing the need to resist in a more organised 
manner. Instead of spreading dissent, jokes are thus thought to sustain the political status quo. 
However, others such as George Orwell believe that “every joke is a tiny revolution” (1969, p. 
184, quoted in Oring, 2004, p. 218). Similarly, Haynes and Prakash have argued that “struggles 
in everyday life can grow into large-scale and conscious challenges to the political or social 
order” (1991, p. 4). 
In the case of popular humour and rumour in Zimbabwe, there are some indications that 
these forms of everyday resistance contributed to some changes in the relationship between the 
rulers and the ruled. Zimbabwe’s lively oral culture was clearly of concern to those in power and 
provoked several responses. While government to the knowledge of this author did not explicitly 
comment on jokes, it did speak out against rumours on a number of occasions. Since 2000, 
numerous rumours have circulated about the possible death of Mugabe or the incidence of 
various illnesses. Often, these rumours did not only circulate via word of mouth but were also 
carried in local private newspapers, global media and on Zimbabwean news websites. They 
would often emerge if Mugabe had not appeared on state television for some time. Given the 
prominent role of the Head of State on ZBC, Mugabe’s temporary absence from the screen often 
raised suspicion among Zimbabweans and frequently produced rumours. For example, in June 
2005, a rumour circulated that Mugabe had died after he was seen visiting a private clinic. In 
order to dispel rumours, government would normally issue a statement in state media or the 
national broadcaster ZBC would ensure to provide evidence of Mugabe’s good health on 
television. For instance, in response to the June 2005 rumour, the state-controlled newspaper The 
Herald published the following rebuttal:  
 
PRESIDENT Mugabe yesterday scoffed at rumours doing rounds in Harare that he died last week 
after a heart failure. Senior Government officials who attended a briefing with the President and 
Vice Presidents Joseph Msika and Joice Mujuru at Zimbabwe House yesterday morning said Cde 
Mugabe laughed off the rumours. “I told the President that he is reportedly dead from last week as a 
result of heart failure. He laughed and said: ‘when did I die and where?’” Secretary for Information 
and Publicity Cde George Charamba told The Herald. Cde Charamba said Cde Mujuru told the 
President that she had also heard that he died and phoned his residence only to be told that Cde 
Mugabe and the First Lady Cde Grace Mugabe had gone to church. He said Vice President Msika 
then said he wondered how a dead person could go to church, to which the President replied that a 
dead person is taken to church for prayers and service before burial. Cde Charamba said he received 
two calls yesterday from the South African media chasing the rumour of the President’s supposed ill 
health. “I had a briefing with the President this morning. He is as fit as a teenager. He is in the best 
of health and is at work. Those doubting can check on Thursday when he addresses Parliament,” he 
said. Rumours have been doing the rounds in Harare that President Mugabe died last week of heart 
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failure. The rumours were being spread through short messages on cellphones. But such rumours 
have become synonymous with plans by the opposition MDC to hold mass actions.21 
 
The newspaper article shows that public speech such as rumours do reach those in power and 
provoke them to respond. It also demonstrates that in dispelling the rumour, government elites 
responded in a manner that was comparable to the way in which ordinary Zimbabweans replied 
to repetitive state discourse: through laughter. While Bakhtin saw laughter primarily as the 
means of ordinary people to undermine officialdom, Mbembe considers laughter not only as the 
domain of the ruled but also as a practice which those in power engage in. As Mbembe argues, 
“[i]n its desire for majesty, the popular world borrows the ideological repertoire of officialdom, 
along with its idioms and forms” (2001, p. 110). But as Mbembe points out, it is not only a 
strategy used by the ruled but similarly, “the official world mimics popular vulgarity, inserting it 
at the core of the procedures by which it takes on grandeur” (2001, p. 110). This is demonstrated 
through the way in which Mugabe was reported to have ‘laughed off’ the rumours about his 
death.  
Despite Mugabe’s mockery of the rumours, these did manage to change the relationship 
between the rulers and the ruled in a modest way because the rumours forced the powerful to 
respond. The inability to control public speech challenged those in power and hereby temporarily 
empowered those subject to government control. With regard to the power of rumour, 
Nyamnjoh, hereby drawing from Kapferer (1987), has conceptualised rumour as “the public’s 
attempt to dialogue with the authorities, for, by revealing secrets and suggesting hypotheses, 
rumour forces the authorities to speak. It challenges the status of government or the conventional 
media as the only authorised voice or channel of communication” (2005, p 217). The very fact 
that government responds to rumours or jokes thus implies that the relationship between the ruler 
and the ruled has changed.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the absence of physical protests in the streets of Zimbabwe should 
not be equated to a lack of resistance against the Harare regime on the part of Zimbabweans. By 
adopting a narrow focus on the forms of resistance associated with dramatic revolutions and 
grand rebellions, journalists and scholars neglected the everyday forms of resistance through 
which Zimbabweans sought to challenge the state such as popular humour and rumour. While, as 
the article demonstrated, these forms of resistance were not able to bring about a significant 
change in power relations in Zimbabwe, Haynes and Prakash (1991, p. 4) have pointed out that 
these struggles can potentially grow into large-scale challenges to the political order. In the run-
up to the 2005 parliamentary elections, the underground group of anti-government activists, 
Zvakwana (‘enough is enough’ in ChiShona), initiated a number of ludic actions that drew from 
everyday forms of resistance. For example, they modified street signs that read as ‘give way’ to 
‘Mugabe give way’, distributed condoms with messages that read ‘Stand up! Get up!’ and 
stamped slogans on bank notes.22  
While Zvakwana did not succeed in catalysing resistance, formal opposition groups such 
as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and civil society organisations could have 
made more efforts to draw upon everyday forms of resistance in their strategies to organise and 
                                                 
21 President scoffs at rumours of his death, The Herald, 7 June 2005. 
22 Zvakwana gears up underground protests, The Independent, 11 March 2005; Wines, Michael, Declaring ‘enough’ 
in Zimbabwe, New York Times, 28 March 2008. 
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catalyse opposition against the ZANU-PF regime. While the MDC had a strong base in the trade 
union movement as well as in the growing civil society, the base of the MDC was subsequently 
broadened to include other interest groups such as urban elites, white farmers and industrialists 
who began to offer their political and financial support to the MDC (Alexander, 2000). These 
changes in its supporter base were also reflected in the campaigns of the opposition party which 
were increasingly phrased in abstract human rights discourse unlikely to be very meaningful to 
its original key constituency of peasants and workers. A more sustained effort to engage with the 
oppositional forms of resistance among ordinary Zimbabweans could have offered the MDC a 
more solid grassroots base. The same holds for Zimbabwe’s civil society organisations which 
have often failed to connect with the lifeworlds of ordinary Zimbabweans. Instead, NGO 
employees emerged as Zimbabwe’s new urban elites, also known as the ‘Pajero brigade’, 
spreading the liberal discourse of human rights while being paid plush salaries in foreign 
currency. 
An example from Zambia may serve to illustrate how popular speech can effectively be 
incorporated into oppositional politics (Spitulnik, 2002, p. 196-197). The slogan of Zambia’s 
ruling party United National Independence Party (UNIP), led by Kenneth Kaunda, had always 
been ‘One Zambia, One Nation’. In the run-up to the 1991 multi-party elections, Zambians 
began to hijack this slogan during UNIP rallies. When the crowds were addressed with the 
slogan ‘One Zambia’, they were supposed to respond with ‘One Nation’. However, instead, 
Zambians responded with ‘One Hour’, hereby indicating that according to them the UNIP 
government would only be allowed into power one more hour. Subsequently, the opposition 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) drew inspiration from this creative subversion 
and introduced its party slogan as ‘The Hour has Come’. Similar strategies of incorporating of 
popular culture into political communication could have been adopted by Zimbabwean 
opposition groups in order to strengthen the grassroots base of their political constituencies and 
to catalyse already existing forms of resistance. 
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